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Abstract
An outsourcing re-encryption program can help a ciphertext owner (delegator) transform his/her
ciphertext into another ciphertext of delegatee. For example, an e-mail receiver can re-transfer an
encrypted e-mail to his secretary while allowing the e-mail to be readable for her. For a multi-hop reencryption, the delegatee can re-encrypt the ciphertext to another user in delegation chain, repeatedly.
Traditionally, this transformation is usually conducted by a proxy or an outsourcing server. However, the
proxy or outsourcing server needs a re-encryption key (i.e., re-key) and the re-encryption program must
execute in a black-box manner (cannot trace into or debug and monitor the program), and thus the
outsource server must be semi-trusted. Actually, as the outsource program was run and fully controlled by
the server, in this paper, we consider a stronger attack in the case that the re-encryption program was run
on an untrusted/malicious server and even the server can trace into the codes and monitor the variables
during the executing. We design a secure multi-hop re-encryption scheme, and then convert the reencryption program into an obfuscated version with constant-hiding to ensure no sensitive information be
revealed. The obfuscator of multi-hop re-encryption is to faithfully hide the program and its sensitive data
that takes a re-encryption program/circuit as input and outputs another program with the same
functionality, while revealing no more sensitive information (i.e., sensitive key and plaintext) than learns
from the blackbox oracle access to the original program. We also present a flexible and controllable
construction of re-encryption scheme, functionality model and its obfuscation version in leveled
multilinear groups, and exemplify some scenarios to deploy in various applications. Finally, we provide the
performance analysis of the obfuscator, such as functionality preservation of consistency, polynomial
slowdown of performance, and average-case virtual black-box of security, and show that the obfuscator is
efficient and practical in use.
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ABSTRACT An outsourcing re-encryption program can help a ciphertext owner (delegator) transform
his/her ciphertext into another ciphertext of delegatee. For example, an e-mail receiver can re-transfer
an encrypted e-mail to his secretary while allowing the e-mail to be readable for her. For a multi-hop
re-encryption, the delegatee can re-encrypt the ciphertext to another user in delegation chain, repeatedly.
Traditionally, this transformation is usually conducted by a proxy or an outsourcing server. However,
the proxy or outsourcing server needs a re-encryption key (i.e., re-key) and the re-encryption program
must execute in a black-box manner (cannot trace into or debug and monitor the program), and thus the
outsource server must be semi-trusted. Actually, as the outsource program was run and fully controlled
by the server, in this paper, we consider a stronger attack in the case that the re-encryption program was
run on an untrusted/malicious server and even the server can trace into the codes and monitor the variables
during the executing. We design a secure multi-hop re-encryption scheme, and then convert the re-encryption
program into an obfuscated version with constant-hiding to ensure no sensitive information be revealed. The
obfuscator of multi-hop re-encryption is to faithfully hide the program and its sensitive data that takes a
re-encryption program/circuit as input and outputs another program with the same functionality, while
revealing no more sensitive information (i.e., sensitive key and plaintext) than learns from the blackbox oracle access to the original program. We also present a flexible and controllable construction of
re-encryption scheme, functionality model and its obfuscation version in leveled multilinear groups, and
exemplify some scenarios to deploy in various applications. Finally, we provide the performance analysis
of the obfuscator, such as functionality preservation of consistency, polynomial slowdown of performance,
and average-case virtual black-box of security, and show that the obfuscator is efficient and practical in use.
INDEX TERMS Average-case virtual black-box, controllable multi-hop, multilinear map, obfuscation,
re-encryption.

I. INTRODUCTION

In proxy re-encryption (PRE) schemes, the proxy should
be semi-trusted so that it will neither leak the sensitive
data or secret information, nor trace into the running program
to monitor the executing maliciously. However, the proxy
might obtain partial secret key from the re-encryption key
(i.e., re-key) in the system, especially after colluding with
the others [2], [27]. Providing an efficient re-encryption
mechanism against malicious proxy in cryptosystems is an
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important and challenging work, and it has many appealing applications in outsourcing the re-encryption program
in (untrusted) cloud servers [27], [35]. Traditionally, most
re-encryption schemes are single-hop, in the sense that the
ciphertext of delegatee is of a different form to the delegator
and cannot be re-encrypted anymore [2], [5], [22], [25], [32].
For example, a ciphertext might not be re-encrypted from
user i to j, and then be re-encrypted again from user j to k
and so forth. Currently, there is no known unidirectional

2169-3536 2017 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only.
Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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FIGURE 1. Controllable multi-hop re-encryption scheme.

and transitive-multi-hop proxy re-encryption scheme, and
Libert and Vergnaud [25] showed an open problem to answer
whether such constructions are possible.
In this work, we give an affirmative answer for the construction of unidirectional and multi-hop re-encryption, and
pay further attention to the outsourcing multi-hop and unidirectional re-encryption mechanism run on an untrusted
server (not necessarily semi-trusted), in which the sensitive
information including the underlying plaintext and the secret
keys is protected when the re-encryption program is oursourced to an untrusted server [20]. We also demonstrate that
the multi-hop is easy-to-control for the number and the depth
of delegation.
A. MOTIVATION

In this work, we consider a scenario of outsoucing a multihop re-encryption program on an untrusted server described
in Fig. 1: Suppose that customer Alice is on her vacation, and
Alice delegates Bob to read and deal with all her sensitive
encrypted emails. As Alice cannot read the email, then she
requests an outsource server Zola (namely email gateway) to
transform (re-encrypt) Alice’s encrypted email to Bob. During
the transformation, Zola needs a re-key rk Alice→Bob generated
by Alice, which is sensitive since the re-key includes the
information of secret key of Alice. Thus the outsourcing
server Zola must be semi-trusted. Furthermore, when Bob
finds out that he cannot deal with the email, and needs the
help of Carol, he also requests the server Zola to transform the encrypted email to the readable form by Carol.
26420

Meanwhile, Zola also needs a re-key rk Bob→Carol generated
by Bob. Obviously, this forms the chain-based delegation of
the re-encryption email. We now consider that the outsourcing server Zola is malicious, that is, Zola can feed into the
re-encryption program and even sets and traces the breakpoints during the program running. We require that, under the
white-box access to the re-encryption program, the malicious
server cannot gain any sensitive information about the secret
key and underlying plaintext.
In order to achieve the privacy and confidentiality of
re-encryption program, we use the technique of constanthiding obfuscation to prevent the server from capturing the
sensitive data (i.e., secret key and plaintext) used in the
program. Actually, unlike (strong) virtual black-box requirement, we only consider the sensitive data protection instead
of protecting total re-encryption program. On the contrary,
we allow the adversary (i.e., untrusted server) to know the
flowchart and algorithm of re-encryption algorithm. In fact,
for a provably secure cryptography scheme, the algorithm
must be public and thus the functionality of the algorithm is
known to the server [33].
Actually, an encryption might slow down a program a
little, however for an obfuscation, it slows down a lot,
especially for the candidate implementation of all circuits
in [15]. Barak et al. [5] demonstrated that we cannot obtain
a generic obfuscation for all circuits or programs in the
(strong) virtual black-box security. This leads to inefficiently
design an obfuscator for all functionalities. We then aim at
the concrete functionality (re-encryption functionality in this
VOLUME 5, 2017
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TABLE 1. Comparison of re-encryptions algorithms.

paper) and provide a more efficient and practical obfuscation
construction.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTION

Unlike a one-hop re-encryption, the input and output of
a multi-hop re-encryption ciphertext should have the same
structure to allow for cascading delegation, i.e. taking a delegation ciphertext and re-encrypting it, repeatedly.
In order to allow the multi-hop re-encryption program
to be run on any (untrusted) outsourcing server, this paper
formalizes the definition and security notion of controllable
multi-hop re-encryption and its obfuscation construction. Our
contribution is described as follows:
1) We give the model and definition of controllable multihop re-encryption scheme MUREnc, which achieves
the properties such as unidirectional re-encryption,
flexible depth control etc. We also illustrate several
scenarios to support different applications.
2) In order to prevent the sensitive leakage from the
re-encryption program running on an untrusted sever,
we define a probabilistic polynomial-time function
of re-encryption, and give us the security model of
obfuscating re-encryption functionality. Concretely,
we require that, even the untrusted server has the ability to access the obfuscated program with a whitebox manner (for example, hack into the program,
watch or debug the breakpoint), the server gains
no more sensitive information from the obfuscated
re-encryption program than having access to the original program with black-box manner. We also guarantee
that the output of obfuscated re-encryption program
and the output of original program are the (extremely
probabilistic) same when taking the same inputs, which
obtains the functionality-preserving of the obfuscation.
3) We design an obfuscator MUREncObf that implements
the re-encryption functionality, and also analyze the
correctness of functionality preservation, efficiency of
polynomial slowdown, and security of average-case
virtual black-box.
Explicitly, under the white-box oracle access to the obfuscation program, the obfuscator MUREncObf has the following properties:
1) Functionality Preservation: The output of obfuscator
has the same results as the output of the original
re-encryption program when taking the same input.
VOLUME 5, 2017

2) Controllable Multi-Hop: A delegator allows his ciphertext to be transformed to the form of the other user in
a controllable manner: he can decide the number of
re-encrypting hop for his ciphertext. Especially, zerohop allows the ciphertext to be decrypted by himself, one-hop permits the ciphertext to be re-encrypted
only once, and the number of controllable multi-hop
can be decided by the delegator when generating a
controllable-depth re-key.
3) Unidirectionality: Bidirectional re-encryption considers that the trust and delegation is bidirectional,
however, user j trusts user j (j can gain access to i’s
confidential data) does not guarantee that user i has
the same power to obtain j’s confidential data (especial in cascading delegation chain-based framework).
We consider the re-encryption to be unidirectional,
i.e., allowing for a ciphertext transferred from user i to j
but not reverse.
4) Plaintext Hiding: During the white-box run of obfuscated re-encryption program, the underlying plaintext
is perfectly hidden for the program server/executor
even the server can trace into the program.
5) Delegator Secret-Key Hiding: The re-key embeds
the delegator’s secret key, and will be used in the
re-encryption program. Evan colluding with the others
but not the delegatee, the sever cannot recover the
delegator’s secret key.
In our scheme, the size of the input ciphertext is constant
and then efficient, i.e., only three elements for any depth
ciphertext, and all re-encryption ciphertexts have the same
form. The comparison of related works is listed in Tab. 1.
C. OVERVIEW OF THE SCHEME

The re-encryption algorithm outputs a transformed ciphertext when taking as input an original ciphertext and a rekey. The re-key is generated by the delegator using his
secret key and the delegatee’s public key. Also, the delegator compiles and obfuscates the re-encryption program
taking the re-key as hardwired input, and sends the obfuscated program to the (untrusted) server. In the construction, to obtain flexible delegation depth, we devise all
re-keys and ciphertexts with the same structure so that the
multi-hop re-encryption delegation is feasible, efficient, and
easy-to-implement.
26421
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Let [sk i , pk i ] and [sk j , pk j ] be two key pairs created by the

zx /x
KeyGen algorithm. The re-key has the form [u, gu j i , g1/z ],
zxj /xi
is calcuwhere u is the delegation depth of re-key, and gu
r
lated by e(pk j , gu−1 )z/sk i for randomly selected z ← Zp .

Idealized Re-Encryption Functionality: Obfuscating a
re-encryption algorithm/circuit is to design a compiler with
respect to a class of circuits. When given a ciphertext ct i
under public key pk i , a trivial algorithm of re-encryption
is to decrypt the ciphertext using delegator’s secret key
sk i and then re-encrypts the underlying plaintext under
public key pk j , and then outputs the ciphertext of pk j .
Obviously, this re-encryption program should be run by
user i since the transformation needs the secret key sk i to
decrypt the original ciphertext. At the same time, user i
can decrypt the ciphertext and then knows the encapsulated
plaintext.
Practical Re-Encryption Functionality: We now consider the re-encryption that is run by a (semi-trusted)
server. At first, the delegator i generates a re-key rk i→j for
the server, and the server uses this key as input to call the
re-encryption program ReEnc and then converts any ciphertext of user i to the one of user j. Ideally, we require that
the obtainable information of the server is indistinguishable
from the information in idealized re-encryption functionality.
However, in a traditional proxy re-encryption, it is impossible
to obtain the indistinguishability.
Obfuscator Design: To avoid the distinguishability of
the re-encryption in the above model, as mentioned earlier,
we convert the semi-trusted re-encryption program into an
obfuscated version. We require that the obfuscated program
has the same functionality with the original program. In order
to obtain a secure obfuscator for re-encryption program,
we firstly design a semantically secure re-encryption scheme,
and give the formal security proof for the scheme. We also
require that the structures of the re-key to support the obfuscatable design, and the structure of ciphertext to support
multi-hop. Then, we define the approximately learnable functionality of re-encryption that describes as a probabilistic
circuit family Cλ . The technological roadmap of designing
an obfuscating transitive-multi-hop re-encryption program is
described as follows:
1) Step 1: Design a semantically secure transitive-multihop re-encryption scheme MUREnc = (Init, KeyGen,
Enc, ReKey, ReEnc);
2) Step 2: Prove the security of MUREnc under the
black-box oracle access to the re-encryption program. Note that we need to prove the security for
both original ciphertext and transformed re-encryption
ciphertext;
3) Step 3: Define the functionality of re-encryption, and
its probabilistic circuit family;
4) Step 4: Design the obfuscator algorithm that taking as input a random instance of probabilistic
circuit family, hardwired information and auxiliary
information;
26422

5) Step 5: Analyze the obfuscator’s properties such as
functionality preservation, polynomial slowdown performance, and prove the average-case black-box security, that is, if there exists an adversary that breaks
the security with access to obfuscated program, then
there exists another algorithm that solves the security of
original re-encryption program with black-box access
to the program. We use a distinguisher to differ the distributions, and show that the advantage of distinguisher
is negligible.
Controllable Multi-Hop: We observe that our transitivemulti-hop re-encryption scheme is a natural extension of
one-hop re-encryption in bilinear maps. In order to obtain
the multi-hop and unidirectional re-encryption, we use the
multilinear map to obtain delegation depth control. As the
unidirectional evaluation of multilinear maps (i.e., Gi+j is
evaluated from the pairing of Gi and Gj , but invertible),
then the delegation chain of re-encryption and re-key are
also unidirectional. To achieve the flexible control of the
delegation, we use three flags v, u and w to denote the depth in
encryption, re-key and re-encryption, respectively. The initial
public key and secret key stay at group G1 , the message stays
at group Gn . The re-key and re-encryption ciphertext stay at
Gi (2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) w.r.t the delegation depth of re-key and
re-encryption. We ensure that u+v+w ≤ n−1, which means
that the maximum delegation depth is n − 1. In Section III-B,
based on our scheme, we provide some practical deployments
and scenarios to adapt to different application environments.
In the decryption, we use the multilinear pairing evaluation
of (re-)key and (re-)ciphertext to cancel out the randomness
and then extracts the plaintext.
Average-Case Virtual Black-Box Security: As our goal
of obfuscation is mainly to protect the privacy of sensitive
constants such as secret key and plaintext, we prove the
security of obfuscation in the average-case black-box model,
in which the input circuit is randomly selected from a family
of circuits and the output is its obfuscated version. Implicitly,
the random selection of a circuit with respect to the random
selection of cryptographic keys. In order to obtain the proof
of average-case black-box security, we use a distinguisher D
in Definition 4 to differ two computationally indistinguishable distributions from family Cλ . One distribution is the
output of adversary which takes input the obfuscated circuit
O(C) (access to obfuscated circuit O(C) with the whitebox manner) and some auxiliary information, and the other
distribution is the output of simulator which has the black-box
oracle to circuit C (access to circuit C with black-box manner,
i.e., only obtains the input/output behavior of the circuit).
In the formal security proof, we give two games Nice and
Junk, in which the distribution of the former is identical to the
output distribution of obfuscation circuit O(C) and the distribution of the later is identical to the output of simulator S.
Finally, we prove the computational indistinguishability of
Nice and Junk under the intraceable assumption in multilinear
groups.
VOLUME 5, 2017
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D. RELATED WORK

E. ROADMAP

Implementing a leveled multilinear map is introduced
into cryptography in 2013, and it provided a useful tool
for constructing functional encryption [9], fully homomorphic encryption and obfuscation [9], [10], [15], [16].
Garg et al. [15] introduced a new model, i.e., combining
graded encoding scheme, complex jigsaw mechanism and
fully homomorphic encryption, to give a candidate obfuscator for indistinguishability obfuscation for all circuits. Later,
Brakerski and Rothblum [7] also proposed a new generalpurpose obfuscator for all polynomial size circuits, in which
they uses graded encoding schemes under the generalization
of multilinear maps. However, as the scheme needs (leveled)
fully homomorphic encryption to implement the obfuscation, so they are much inefficient. Zimmerman [35] gave an
obfuscation scheme for general program that uses a straightline program to describe arithmetic circuit and thus does
not impose the transformation of inefficient matrix branch
programs and the scheme was constructed in composite-order
multilinear groups. In order to construct more efficient obfuscators, some slight weak and practical obfuscations were
proposed [18], [23], [35].
The definition of average-case virtual secure obfuscation is first given by Hohenberger et al. [22], which can
solve the impossibility of predicate black-box security for
larger cryptographic system. Average-case secure obfuscation ensures that, provided a cryptographic scheme has the
distinguishability property, if there exists an adversary against
a cryptographic protocol when given access to an obfuscated program then there exists an adversary with blackbox access to the original program with similar probability.
Obfuscation is a very useful tool for the construction of many
new cryptographic primitives [21]. A prominent example is
functional encryption for all circuits, and then provides strong
access control properties in distributed systems [10], [15].
Shi et al. [29] proposed an obfuscatable designated verifier signature scheme in the average-case virtual black-box
security.
A natural paradigm of re-encryption mechanism is
proxy re-encryption, in which a semi-trusted proxy performs the re-encryption program using the re-encryption
key [2], [24], [27], [30]. Compared with obfuscating
re-encryption, proxy re-encryption cannot achieve the obfuscator’s security level, since the (untrusted) proxy can
gain some non-black-box information about the delegator’s
re-encryption secret key, especially when the re-encryption
program is run in white-box manner.
Several one-hop re-encryption schemes and the obfuscation were proposed in [22]. In some of multi-hop
(non-transitive) re-encryptions, the ciphertext size and the
decryption complexity grow linearly in the number of
re-encryption hops [9]. In the scheme of [24], although the
ciphertext is constant, however, the re-encryption is bidirectional. In [28], Nuñez et al. proposed an efficient proxy
re-encryption in NRTU.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we provide some notations, primitives and definitions that
will be used in this paper. In Section III, we give the definition, security model, and construction of controllable multihop re-encryption scheme, and also analyze the security.
Furthermore, we provide some deployments of our scheme to
satisfy different application needs. In Section IV, we present
the model and definition of re-encryption functionality and
circuit, and in Section V, we propose the concrete construction for obfuscating the re-encryption algorithm, and give
the performance analysis and security proof in Section VI.
Finally, in Section VII, we draw the conclusion of the work.
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II. PRELIMINARIES
A. MEANINGFUL NOTATIONS AND TERMS

Unless specified otherwise, we denote by λ ∈ N the security
parameter and by 1λ its unary representation. Let Z be the
set of integers and Zp be the ring modulo p. Let [n] be the
set {1, 2, · · · , n} and [n, m] be the set {n, n + 1, · · · , m}.
We use the term p.p.t to denote a probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm. A function is negligible in λ (denoted µ(λ))
if it is smaller than the inverse of any polynomial, for all
large enough value of λ ∈ N. We use 1(A, B) to denote the
statistical distance of two random variables A and B.
In this paper, we assume that the computation for describing program is encoded into the family of polynomial-sized
circuit. A class of circuits is of the form {Cn }n∈N , where Cn
denotes a set of polynomial-size circuits with input length
lin (n) and output length lout (n), and lin (n) and lout (n) are
polynomial in n, respectively. For a circuit C ∈ Cn , let C(x; r)
be a probabilistic circuit running C with random coin r on
r
regular input x ∈ {0, 1}n , and C ← Cn be a randomly
sampled circuit C from family Cn .
We denote O(C) as an obfuscator of C that takes a circuit C
as input and outputs a same functional circuit. We denote
A and S as an adversary algorithm and a simulator algorithm
respectively, and use S C (·) to denote S having a black-box
oracle access to circuit C.
B. DEFINITION OF OBFUSCATION

An obfuscator for a class of circuits Cn is a p.p.t algorithm
that takes as input a circuit C ∈ Cn and outputs an unintelligible circuit O(C). The formal definition of provably secure
obfuscation is given as follows:
Definition 1 (Obfuscation): A uniform p.p.t algorithm O
is called an obfuscator for a function/circuit family Cn , if the
following conditions are satisfied:
1) (Functionality Preservation:) There exists a negligible
function µ(k) such that for any C ∈ Cn and all input
x ∈ {0, 1}k ,
Pr[∃x ∈ {0, 1}k : O(C)(x) 6 = C(x)] ≤ µ(k)

(1)

2) (Polynomial Slowdown): There is a polynomial p such
that, ∀C ∈ Cn , O(C) runs in time at most poly(t),
26423
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where t denotes the worst-case running time or the size
of circuit C. i.e.,

(2)

3) (Virtual Black-Box Security): For any p.p.t algorithm
A, there exists a p.p.t simulator S such that for
all C ∈ C,
Pr [b ← A(O(C)) : b = 1]

A,O

− Pr[b ← S C (1|C| ) : b = 1] ≤ µ(·)
S

(3)

where the probabilities are taken over the random selection
circuit C from Cn , and the random coins of A and S.
In the security of virtual black-box access to the circuit C,
to avoid the worst-case impossibility of obfuscation in (3),
we consider the average-case virtual black-box property such
that the simulator S can only simulate the output for a random
function in the circuit family Cn . Actually, our goal is to
protect the secret key used in the re-encryption program run in
a white-box access such as tracing into the program or monitoring the executing. As the secret keys are randomly selected
and uniformly distributed, and the average-case security is
enough for the obfuscation. Concretely, the average-case
security under the virtual black-box access is defined as: for
large enough λ, every polynomial-size auxiliary input aux,
there exists a p.p.t distinguisher D,

Pr [C ← Cn , DC A(O(C), λ, aux), aux = 1]
A,O


− Pr[C ← Cn , DC S C (1|C| , λ, aux), aux = 1] ≤ µ(·)
S

(4)
In (4), for a randomly sampled circuit C, the information of
adversary A obtaining from the obfuscated circuit O(C) can
also be mounted by a simulator S with oracle access to the
input/output behavior of C, and the distinguisher D cannot
identify them.
C. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES

Multilinear groups (i.e., groups with an n-linear map for
n > 2), which also known as graded multilinear
maps or graded encodings, have been considered in a
number of works both for functionality and for security
reason [12], [15], [16].
E
Definition 2 (Leveled Multilinear Map): Let G
=
(G1 , G2 , · · · , Gn ) be a sequence of groups each of large
prime order p, and g1 , g2 , · · · , gn be the canonical generators
of G1 , G2 , · · · , Gn respectively, and set g = g1 and gE =
(g1 , g2 , · · · , gn ). For a set of efficiently computable bilinear
{ei,j : Gi × Gj → Gi+j |i, j ≥ 1 ∧ i + j ≤ n}, a leveled
multilinear map is defined as: ∀gi ∈ Gi , gj ∈ Gj , u, v ∈ Zp ,
such that ei+j (gui , gvj ) = guv
i+j .
E = (G1 , · · · , Gn ) the multilinear groups. Briefly,
We call G
we use e : e(gui , gvj ) = guv
i+j to denote the multilinear map.
26424

Pj

k=1 ik

≤ n, we have

e(h1 , h2 , · · · , hj )
= e(h1 , e(h2 , e(h3 , · · · , e(hj−1 , hj ) · · · ))) ∈ G1+2+···+j

time(O(C)) ≤ poly(time(C)),
size(O(C)) ≤ poly(size(C))

Obviously, for all hj ∈ Gij and

We use MG(1λ , n) to denote a p.p.t algorithm to generate
the instance of multilinear groups, in which λ is the security
parameter, i.e., p ≥ 2λ , and n is the maximum depth of
E p, gE, e) ← MG(1λ , n).
pairing operations, i.e., (G,
Garg et al. [16] gave the definition of an approximate
version of a multilinear group family that uses the technique
of graded encoding systems. The multilinear groups have the
following computationally infeasible assumptions.
Definition 3 (Multilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman
Assumption, k-MDDH Assumption) [16]: Given a tuple
[g, gc1 , gc2 , · · · , gck+1 , Q] for g ∈ G1 , c1 , c2 , · · · , ck+1 ∈ Zp ,
and Q ∈ Gk , it is hard forPany polynomial-time algorithm
cj
to decide whether Q = gk j∈[k+1] or not with better than
negligible advantage in security parameter λ of multilinear
group generating algorithm MG(1λ , n).
Definition 4 (Multilinear Decisional Divisible DiffieHellman Assumption, MDDDH Assumption): Given a tuple
[g, gc1 , gc2 , Q] for g ∈ G1 , c1 , c2 ∈ Zp , and Q ∈ Gk for
c /c
k ∈ [n], it is hard to distinguish whether Q = gk2 1 .
Actually, the MDDDH assumption is a variant
(i.e., k = 2) of decisional divisible Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDDH assumption) in bilinear groups [3]. Concretely,
c /c
DDDH implies MDDDH. We obtain gk2 1 by computing
c2 /c1
e(g2 , gk−2 ).
Definition 5 (eXtensional
MDDDH,
XMDDDH
Assumption): Given a tuple [g, gc1 , gc2 , g−c3 , Q] such that
g ∈ G1 , c1 , c2 , c3 ∈ Zp , and Q ∈ Gk for k ∈ [n], it is hard to
c c /c
distinguish whether Q = gk2 3 1 .
III. MULTI-HOP AND UNIDIRECTIONAL RE-ENCRYPTION
A. MODEL AND CONSTRUCTION

Definition 6 (Multi-hop and Unidirectional Re-encryption
Scheme, MUREnc): A multi-hop and unidirectional
re-encryption scheme MUREnc is defined as a tuple
MUREnc = (Init, KeyGen, Enc, Dec, ReKey, ReEnc) of
six algorithms:
1) pp ← Init(1λ , n): Taking as input the security parameter λ and the maximum delegation depth n, this algorithm is performed by the trusted authority to output
the system parameter pp. Note that pp is public and all
other algorithms implicitly include it.
2) [sk i , pk i ] ← KeyGen(i): The key generation algorithm
is called by user i that outputs a secret/public key pair
(sk i , pk i ) ∈ K.
3) ct [v]
← Enc(v, pk i , M ): The encryption algorithm is
i
performed by a sender and outputs a ciphertext ct i[v] that
taking as input a public key pk i , a level label v and a
message M ∈ M.
4) M ← Dec(v, ct [v]
i , sk i ): The decryption algorithm
outputs the plaintext when taking as input a valid secret
key and an v-depth ciphertext.
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FIGURE 2. Workflow and modules of MUREnc scheme.

5) rk [u]
i→j ← ReKey(u, sk i , pk j ): The algorithm outputs a
u-th level re-key rk [u]
i→j that taking as input a level node
label u, a delegator’s secret key sk i and a delegatee’s
public key pk j .
[v]
6) ct [u+v+w]
← ReEnc(w, rk [u]
j
i→j , ct i ): Taking as input a
u-level re-key, a v-level ciphertext and a control depth
w, the re-encryption algorithm outputs a transformed
(u + v + w)-th level ciphertext.
Note that the re-encryption transformation is to convert
a ciphertext of user i into a ciphertext of user j with the
restriction that the transformed depth of a ciphertext does not
exceed the maximum depth n−1. The illustration of workflow
and modules of scheme MUREnc is described in Fig. 2
Remark 1: Note that the message space is Gn , the key
space is G1 and the re-key space is defined in {Gi }i∈[2,n−1] .
A secret key owner can delegate the decryptable re-encryption
ciphertext with at most depth (n − 1)-hop. In this case,
the re-encryption chain is proceeded as

Remark 2: As the one-way evaluation of multilinear map,
the re-encryption is also unidirectional.
Remark 3: Let rk [u]
i→j = [rk1 , rk2 , rk3 ] be a re-key, and
[v]
ct i = [c0 , c1 , c2 ] be a ciphertext. A re-encryption ciphertext
from i to j has the form:
= [c00 , c01 , c02 ]
ct [u+v+w]
j
= [c0 + w, e(c1 , rk ui→j , gw ), c2 ]
xr

j
= [u + v + w, gu+v+w
, M · grn ]

= [k,

xr
gkj ,

M · grn ]

(7)

where k = u + v + w. The output of re-encryption algorithm
ReEnc has identical distribution to the output of encryption
algorithm Enc .
Explicitly, we can re-randomize a re-encryption ciphertext
by selecting a randomness r 0 ← Zp randomly, and calculating
and outputting
0

x (r+r 0 )

[2]
→ ReEnc(2, rk [2]
2→3 , ct 2 )

(5)

→ ···
→

[n−1]
ReEnc(n − 1, rk [n−1]
n−1→n , ct n−1 )

That is,
rk [1]
1→2

rk [2]
2→3

rk [n−1]
n−1→n

[2]
[n−1]
ct [1]
−→ ct 2 −→ · · · −→ ct n−1
−→
1
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0

ct [u+v+w]
= [c0 , c01 · e(pk j , gu , gv−1 , gw )r , c02 · gnr ]
j

[1]
ReEnc(1, rk [1]
1→2 , ct 1 )

ct [n]
n

(6)

0

j
= [u + v + w, gu+v+w
], M · gr+r
]
(8)
n
We use Re-randomize(ct) to denote the above rerandomized procedure that produces a same distributed
ciphertext as before. Note that we will use the
Re-randomize(·) algorithm to re-randomize an output
ciphertext in the concrete constructions. We give the construction of MUREnc in Fig. 3.
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and identical distribution. Actually, the ciphertext is a variant
of Elgamal encryption [13] in multilinear groups.
For a zero-hop ciphertext ct [v] = [v, gxvi r , M · grn ] and a
secret key sk = xi , the decryption is calculated by
c2 e(c1 , gn−v )−1/sk i
= M · grn · e(gxvi r , gn−v )−1/xi
= M · grn · g−r
n =M

(9)

For a one-hop ciphertext: On receiving a ciphertext ct [v]
1 =
[v, gxvi r , Mgrn ], the delegator (user i) creates a re-key for the
zxj /xi 1/z
, g ], and re-encrypts
delegatee (user j) as rk [u]
i→j = [u, gu
xj r
the ciphertext as ct j = [n − 1, gn−1 , M · grn ], i.e., sets w = n −
u − v + 1, and then sends the re-key and re-encryption ciphertext to user j. User j uses his secret key sk j = xj to decrypt
the re-encryption ciphertext as: c2 e(c1 , gn−c0 )−1/sk j → M .
As the level of re-encryption ciphertext is n − 1, obviously,
it cannot be re-encrypted anymore.
A re-encryption ciphertext has the form ct [k]
=
j
xr
[k, gkj , Mgrn ], which is a k-level valid ciphertext of user j and
has the same distribution with the ciphertext output by Enc
algorithm, and the decryption is also consistent by calculating
c2 e(c1 , gn−k )−1/sk j → M . Also, we can transform the k-level
ciphertext into a deeper delegation, i.e., for adding k 0 -hop, set
0
xj rr 0
0
r0
rr 0
c00 = c0 +k 0 , c01 = e(c1 , grk 0 −1 ) = gk+k
0 , c2 = c2 ·gn = Mgn .
Remark 4: A v-level ciphertext has the form ct [v] =
[v, gxvi r , Mgrn ]. Obviously, if G1 = G2 = · · · = Gn , and e is
defined as e : G × · · · × G → G (i.e., self-pairing) and multilinear maps can be obtained by iterating the self-pairing, then
all keys and ciphertexts stay at G1 . In this case, the encryption is a variant of Elgamal encryption [13]. If n = 3 and
e is a type-2 bilinear map, that is e : G1 × G2 → G3 ,
then the ciphertext is an Elgamal-like encryption in bilinear
groups. It is easily to see that, in this case, it can only
provide one-hop re-encryption functionality in bilinear group
model [2], [25].
2) CONTROLLABLE DEPLOYMENTS OF THE SCHEME

FIGURE 3. Construction of multi-hop re-encryption scheme.

B. CONSISTENCY AND DEPLOYMENT

In this section, we give the correctness and consistency analysis of the scheme, and then provide the flexible solutions for
the deployments in practical applications.
1) CORRECTNESS AND CONSISTENCY

Theorem 1: The scheme MUREnc is correct.
Proof: We consider the correctness and consistency
of three types of ciphertexts: zero-hop ciphertext (without
re-encryption), one-hop ciphertext and multi-hop ciphertext.
It is easily to see that all ciphertexts have the same structure
26426

We now provide the practical and controllable deployments
of the scheme to satisfy the different requirements. As both
the re-keys and the re-encryption ciphertexts stay in some Gk
for 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, we employ the level labels, v in initial
ciphertext, u in re-key and w in re-encryption ciphertext,
to flexibly and controllably deploy the scheme by setting
these parameters.
1) (Zero-Hop Deployment): If a user does not allow his
ciphertext to be re-encrypted, he sets the encryption
algorithm with maximum level v = n − 1. That is,
r
the ciphertext has the form ct = [n − 1, gxr
n−1 , Mgn ].
The deployment of zero-hop re-encryption is shown
in Fig. 4.
2) (One-Hop Deployment): If a delegator i of pk i allows
re-encryption for delegatee pk j using his re-key only
once, i.e., one-hop, he can generate a re-key for user j
z/sk i = gzxj /xi , g1/z ],
as rk [n−2]
i→j = [n − 2, e(pk j , gn−3 )
n−2
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by computing
xi r
xi r
r
ct [v]
1 = [c0 , c1 , c2 ] = [v, e(g1 , gv−1 ) = gv , Mgn ]

FIGURE 4. Deployment of zero-hop re-encryption.

i.e., by setting u = n − 2. As the unidirectional of the
delegation, and the original ciphertext v ≥ 1, and in
this case the allowable re-encryption level w = n − u −
v < 2. The user j can re-encrypt the ciphertext at most
one time. The deployment of one-hop scheme is shown
in Fig. 5.

FIGURE 5. Deployment of one-hop re-encryption.

3) (Multi-Hop Deployment): The maximum allowable
delegation depth is n − 1. That is, the re-encryption key
is transformed into staying in G2 for the first delegaz/xi =
tion run by user i (i.e., rk [2]
i→j = [2, e(pk j , g1 )
zx /x

g2 j i , g1/z ]), in G3 for the second delegation run
by user j (i.e., rk [3]
= [3, e(pk k , g2 )z/xj =
j→k
zx /x

g3 k j , g1/z ]), and the last delegation is in Gn−1 with
re-key rk [n−1]
n−2→n−1 ∈ Gn−1 . We can control the values
of u, v and w to obtain a flexible multi-hop system.
The deployment of multi-hop re-encryption is shown
in Fig. 6.

FIGURE 6. Deployment of multi-hop re-encryption.

Remark 5: More interesting, the delegator can flexibly
control the delegation depth and allowable re-encryption
times. For example, the delegator wants to decrease the
number of re-encryption in ciphertext ct = [c0 , c1 , c2 ], for
instance reduce d-depth, then he can re-calculate the ciphertext: ct 0 = [c0 − d, c1 e(c1 , gd−1 )r , cr2 ] for randomly selected
r ← Zp .
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS

A first-level ciphertext has the form ct 1[v] = [v, gxvi r , M · grn ].
Note that any v-level ciphertext (v ≥ 2) can be calculated
from an v = 1 ciphertext. More concretely, let ct [1]
=
1
[1, gx1i r , Mgrn ], we can obtain an v-level ciphertext ct [v]
1
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As the computation unidirectional of multilinear map,
the first-level ciphertext (stays in G1 ) will reveal strictly
more information than the other level ciphertexts (stays in
Gk (k ≥ 2)). Thus we only need to prove that the first level
ciphertext is provably secure.
Theorem 2: The MUREnc scheme is semantically secure
in the standard model under the MDDDH assumption in
multilinear groups.
Proof: Assume that there exists an adversary A =
(A1 , A2 ) against the security of MUREnc scheme, we construct an algorithm B to break MDDDH problem with
k = n: given an instance tuple [g, gc1 , gc2 , Q] to output
c /c
Q = gn2 1 or not.
At first B sets gc2 = gαc1 for some unknown α ∈ Zp . In the
challenge phase, B outputs the ciphertext ct = [1, gc2 , M0 Q]
as the challenge and sends it to the adversary A. Note that
c /c
c /c
Q = gn2 1 = gαn if Q = gn2 1 , which is a consistent
challenge ciphertext (i.e., ct = [1, gαc1 , M1 gαn ]), and the
challenge ciphertext is an (incorrect) random tuple otherwise.
Obviously, for a consistent challenge ciphertext, gc1 acts as
the public key of the user and it is hard to get c1 from the
tuple.
If the adversary A outputs b = 0 (M0 hides in the challenge
c /c

ciphertext and decryption is correct), B returns Q = gn2 1
as the answer of MDDDH problem. Otherwise if A outputs
c /c
b = 1, then B returns Q 6 = gn2 1 as the answer.

IV. MODEL OF OBFUSCABLE REENCRYPTION ALGORITHM
A. RE-ENCRYPTION FUNCTIONALITY AND CIRCUIT

We now consider how to transform the re-encryption algorithm ReEnc into an obfuscated version O(ReEnc), and run
O(ReEnc) to perform the same functionality. More concretely, a re-encryption obfuscator is also considered as a
class of circuits that achieving the same functionality of
ReEnc, while without revealing the secret key sk i and the
message M during the transformation, even he can monitor
the memory and obtains all the values during running the
program.
Additionally, we use the functionality of re-encryption
to output the pairs of public keys [pk i , pk j ], with which it
converts and re-encrypts the ciphertexts from pk i into pk j .
The re-encryption functionality RE(x) is defined as follows:

if x=keys;
 [pk i , pk j ],
RE(x) = Enc(v, pk j , Dec(sk i , x)), if re-encrypt; (10)

∅
otherwise.
Remark 6: During the run of Enc(v, pk j , Dec(sk i , x)) in
RE() function, it first decrypts the ciphertext x to obtain
plaintext M using the secret key sk i , and then re-encrypts the
M to pk j . If the executable program of RE(x) can have a whitebox access (i.e., program is controlled by untrusted executor),
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then we can easily capture the secret key sk i and underlying
cleartext M .
Remark 7: In the definition of RE(x), we provide a special
input keys that outputs a pair of public keys of delegator pk i
and delegatee pk j , which can be considered as the identification of the delegator/delegatee, and will be used in the rerandomization of the input and output.
In the functionality of re-encryption RE(x), the input is x
(i.e., described as a ciphertext), and we also need the key
[sk i , pk i ] of delegator and the public key pk j of delegatee
that are implicitly used in the function evaluation. In order
to obtain the key pair [sk i , pk i , pk j ], we define the key generation (access) circuit family as follows:
n
Cλ = Csk i ,pk i ,pk j [sk i , pk i ] ← KeyGen(i),
[sk j , pk j ] ← KeyGen(j),
o
pp ← Init(1λ , n)

λ∈N

(11)

Let Csk i ,pk i ,pk j be the description of a probabilistic circuit
implementing the re-encryption functionality RE(x). We note
that all constants in the functionality of re-encryption are
hardwired in the circuit description, which can be extracted
by gaining access to the description of the circuit.
V. OBFUSCATING RE-ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM

In order to provide a secure re-encryption program run by
an untrusted server, we will guarantee that the server cannot
gain any sensitive information during the perform. (i.e., sensitive sk i and plaintext M will not be revealed to the server.
However, as the plaintext is perfectly hidden in the ciphertext
due to the semantic security of encryption scheme, and the
re-encryption procedure only evaluates on the ciphertexts.
Thus we only consider the possible reveal of the secret key.

A defined as below is negligible,
ind-cpa

AdvA

(λ) = 1(IND0,A (λ, β), IND1,A (λ, β)) ≤ µ(λ)

where the experiment INDb,A (λ, β) is defined as follows:
INDb,A (λ, β):
1) pp ← Init(1λ , n)
2) [sk i , pk i ] ← KeyGen(i)
[sk j , pk j ] ← KeyGen(j)
3) Set C = Csk i ,pk i ,pk j 1
2 s.t.
4) [M0 , M1 , β, aux] ← AC
1 (λ)
M0 , M1 ∈ M and |M0 | = |M1 |
5) ct ← Enc(pk β , Mb )
6) b0 ← AC
2 (ct, (M0 , M1 ), aux)
7) Output 1 if b0 = b and 0 otherwise.
Note that A1 outputs a valid challenge message pair M0 and
M1 ∈ M, and A2 outputs the guess. Here aux denotes
the auxiliary information that the adversary can gain in the
experiment.
Remark 8: We ensure that both the ciphertext of pk i and
pk j are all provably secure. In the indistinguishability experiment INDb,A (λ, β) , we use a flag β to describe that a
ciphertext for delegator pk i (β = 0 denotes an original ciphertext) or delegatee pk j (β = 1 denotes a re-encrypted ciphertext), and prove the semantic security of both ciphertexts.
Actually, in our construction, the encryption ciphertext of pk i
and the re-encryption ciphertext of pk j have the same form
and distribution, then we only prove one of them is enough.
We use the statistical distance to compute the distribution and
show that the adversary’s outputs are statistically close.
Definition 8 (Obfuscated Ciphertext Security with Oracle
Csk i ,pk i ,pk j ): Let A = (A1 , A2 ) be the p.p.t algorithm. The
scheme MUREnc is secure for transformed ciphertext under
gaining access to circuit oracle Csk i ,pk i ,pk j if the advantage of
A is negligible
t-ind-cpa

A. SECURITY MODEL OF OBFUSCATING RE-ENCRYPTION

For an obfuscation of multi-hop re-encryption scheme,
we allow an adversary to lean any sensitive information
about the secret key when the obfuscated re-encryption
is run in an untrusted outsourcing server in a white-box
manner. Compared with the traditional re-encryption procedure, we give the stronger attack ability in the obfuscating
program, the adversary can monitor the program executing or trace or debug the program. We now give the security
model when the adversary is given black-box access to the
re-encryption oracle. More concretely, we require the semantic security of both original ciphertext and re-encryption
ciphertext, and also the virtual black-box security of
re-encrypted ciphertext.
Definition 7: (Semantic Security With Oracle Csk i ,pk i ,pk j ):
Let MUREnc be the multi-hop and unidirectional
re-encryption scheme, and A = (A1 , A2 ) be the p.p.t algorithm that the adversary can perform. The scheme MUREnc
is semantically secure against chosen-plaintext attacks under
gaining access to circuit oracle Csk i ,pk i ,pk j if the advantage of
26428

AdvA

(λ) = 1(tIND0,A (λ), tIND1,A (λ)) ≤ µ(λ)
(12)

where the experiment tINDA (λ) is defined as follows:
tINDb,A (λ):
1) pp ← Init(1λ , n)
2) [sk i , pk i ] ← KeyGen(i)
[sk j , pk j ] ← KeyGen(j)
3) Set C = Csk i ,pk i ,pk j
4) [M0 , M1 , aux] ← AC
1 (λ, sk 1 ) s.t.
M0 , M1 ∈ M and |M0 | = |M1 |
5) rand ← {0, 1}λ
6) obf ← C(Enc(pk i , Mb ); rand)
7) b0 ← AC
2 (obf , (M0 , M1 ), aux)
8) Output 1 if b0 = b and 0 otherwise.
Remark 9: In the experiment tINDb,A (λ), C is an
obfuscation circuit that transforms a ciphertext from
1C
sk i ,pk i ,pk j is defined in (11).
2 AC means that algorithm A can have access to oracle circuit C in a
1

black-box manner.
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Enc(pk i , Mb ; rand) into an unintelligent one. We note that,
like in ReEnc algorithm, the randomness rand is used to
re-randomize the transformed ciphertext. Moreover, we allow
the adversary to have access to the delegator’s key sk i . That
is, the delegator cannot obtain the sensitive information from
the obfuscator’s output, and thus it achieves the security of
re-encryption functionality.
Theorem 3: The encryption scheme MUREnc is semantically secure with oracle Csk i ,pk i ,pk j .
Theorem 4: The encryption scheme MUREnc obtains
obfuscated ciphertext security with oracle Csk i ,pk i ,pk j .
Proof: We first note that, in the experiment tINDb,A (λ),
C
the algorithms AC
1 (·) and A2 (·) have the black-box oracle
access to the circuit C, i.e., only obtains input/output behaviors of the circuit C.
As the circuit C implements the obfuscation of
re-encryption algorithm, and then has the same functionality
as re-encryption. According to the property of functionality preservation, the obfuscation output obf is computationally indistinguishable from the output of re-encryption
ReEnc(ct i , rk i→j ). As the circuit C takes as input a ciphertext
generated by semantically secure encryption algorithm Enc,
the obfuscated output obf is also indistinguishable for the
plaintext Mb .
We further consider the case that algorithm A1 is able to
access to sk i . Actually, the output of C is a re-encryption
ciphertext of pk j , which is independent to the delegator i.
Obtaining the delegator’s secret key sk i , it is no use decrypting or distinguishing a re-encrypted ciphertext. That is,
the multi-hop re-encryption scheme is forward secure.
B. OBFUSCATOR FOR MULTI-HOP RE-ENCRYPTION

In this section, we present an obfuscator construction for the
class of multi-hop and unidirectional re-encryption circuit Cλ
relative to the re-encryption algorithm ReEnc in the scheme
MUREnc.
From the description of re-encryption function RE(x),
we can extract a circuit family Csk i ,pk i ,pk j that the keys [sk i =
xi , pk i = gxi , pk j = gxj ] can be read from the circuit
description. The algorithm of obfuscator MUREncObf is
shown in Fig.7.
The evaluation of obfuscator Opk i ,pk j ,aux (x) gives either a
ciphertext ct = [c0 , c1 , c2 ] or a special symbol keys as the
input together with random values rand ← {0, 1}2λ that
sampling the variants r 0 and r 00 uniformly from Zp .
Remark 10: Actually, from the view of obfuscator creation, the obfuscator circuit Opk i ,pk j ,aux (x) is produced by the
delegator who holds the secret key sk i , and then is distributed
to some other (untrusted) party to run the obfuscator to implement the re-encryption without revealing either key sk i .
C. ANALYSIS

In this section, we give the correctness, performance and
security analysis of the obfuscator. Obviously, the algorithm MUREncObf satisfies the functionality of transitivemulti-hop re-encryption. That is, it implements the
VOLUME 5, 2017

FIGURE 7. Algorithm of MUREncObf obfuscator.

function of RE(x). For the output of obfuscator MUREncObf,
it has identical distribution with the output of functionality
RE(x) defined in (10). We have the following theorem:
Theorem 5: The algorithm MUREncObf is an averagecase secure virtual black-box obfuscator for the circuit
family Cλ .
Proof: By the definition and requirement of obfuscation in Definition 1, we give the correctness of functionality
preservation in Lemma 1, efficiency of polynomial slowdown
in Lemma 2, and security of average-case virtual black-box
in Lemma 3, to satisfy the requirements of the obfuscation.
Lemma 1 (Functionality Preservation): Consider any circuit Csk i ,pk i ,pk j ∈ Cλ and let circuit Opk i ,pk j ,aux ←
MUREncObf (Csk i ,pk i ,pk j ) be the output of implementing
obfuscation algorithm MUREncObf. For any possible input,
the MUREncObf algorithm is functionality-preserving for
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the circuit family Cλ with the identical distributions of
Csk i ,pk i ,pk j and Opk i ,pk j ,aux .
Proof: We prove the property of functionality preservation by considering the identical output distributions of
Csk i ,pk i ,pk j and MUREncObf (Csk i ,pk i ,pk j ) on an input ciphertext x = ct. For a properly generated delegator ciphertext of
any message M ∈ M, we observe that ct has the form
(13)

We have proved the security for the scheme MUREnc, and
then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6: Let D be a dummy distinguisher without havr
ing access to the obfuscation oracle, for any C ← Cλ ,
r
r
pk i ← gxi , pk j ← gxj where xi , xj ← Zp , w ← Zn−1 .
0
0
0
Let [rk1 , rk2 , rk3 ] and [rk1 , rk2 , rk3 ] be the valid and invalid
re-key with same delegation depth, respectively. For some
auxiliary information aux, there exists

for some randomness r ← Zp .
When this properly formed ciphertext of message M ∈
M is fed into the obfuscator circuit Opk i ,pk j ,aux , the circuit
outputs


Pr[D pk i , pk j , (rk1 , rk2 , rk3 ), (w, aux) = 1]

− Pr[D pk i , pk j , (rk10 , rk20 , rk30 ), (w, aux) = 1] ≤ µ(λ)

Enc(v, pk i , M ) → [v, gxvi r , Mgrn ]

Opk i ,pk j ,aux (Enc(v, pk i , M ))
r 00

r 00

= [c000 , c001 e(pk j , gu , gv−1 , gw ) , c002 gn ]

0
00 
r+r 0 +r 00
= u + v + w, gu+v+w
, M · gnr+r +r

(14)

for some selected r 0 , r 00 ← Zp . Substituting r̂ = r + r 0 + r 00
and k = u+v+w, the output of the obfuscator can be rewritten
as k, gr̂k , M · gr̂n .
Obviously, the above distribution is identical to the output
of Enc(v, pk i , M ) for all M ∈ M. For a multi-hop ciphertext,
the output of obfuscator is also identical to the output of the
re-encryption ciphertext.
Lemma 2 (Polynomial Slowdown): The MUREncObf
obfuscator satisfies the polynomial slowdown property.
Proof: Polynomial slowdown is evident: compared with
the re-encryption scheme via decrypt-then-encrypt in (10),
it is easily to see that the obfuscator MUREncObf is efficient
within the polynomial time of the original scheme in that
it only calculates a few operations in multilinear maps, and
thus the obfuscator follows the efficiency requirement of
polynomial slowdown.
Lemma 3 (Average-Case Virtual Black-Box Security): The
MUREncObf obfuscator satisfies average-case secure virtual
black-box property.
Proof: For simplicity, we write MUREncObf (C) as
O(C) for any C ∈ Cλ . In order to obtain the property
of virtual black-box, we consider an adversary who outputs
the code of the obfuscated circuit O(C) for each C ∈ Cλ ,
and then we construct a simulator S C (λ, aux) to achieve a
negligible advantage when a distinguisher DC takes as input
the obfuscated circuit C (gain access to C) and some auxiliary
input aux. That is,

Pr[DC O(C), aux = 1]

− Pr[DC S |C| (λ, aux), aux = 1] ≤ µ(λ) (15)
where the probability is taken over the selection of circuit C, the random coins of distinguisher D, obfuscator O and
simulator S.
At first we give the dummy distinguisher D that outputs
whatever is given as input. For a dummy distinguisher D,
as the distinguisher cannot access the circuit, then the scheme
is reduced as the re-encryption scheme defined in Fig.3.
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Proof: Note that in this theorem, D is a dummy distinguisher and cannot gain access to any oracle, then the
auxiliary information aux includes only the public information pp. In the above distributions for a same delegation
depth u, we have rk1 = rk10 = u. Distinguishing the above
two distributions is reduced to solve the MDDDH problem,
i.e., given two distributions
zx /xi

(pk i = gxi , pk j = gxj , rk1 = u, rk2 = gu j

, rk3 = g1/z )

(pk i = g , pk j = g , rk1 = u, rk2 = R, rk3 = R0 )
xi

xj

zx /x

and decide whether R = gu j i . Under the assumption
MDDDH, the distributions (pk i , pk j , w, u, rk2 , rk3 , aux) and
(pk i , pk j , w, u, rk20 , rk30 , aux)
are
computationally
indistinguishable.
In the obfuscation scheme, the simulator S having access
to the circuit C takes as input security parameter λ and
some auxiliary string aux, and performs the deployment and
response as in Fig. 8.

FIGURE 8. Response of the simulator.

Notice that the output of circuit description from the simulator S does not correctly calculate the functionality of
re-encryption since rk 0 is not a correct re-key (only randomly
picked values), and thus the output from the simulator reveals
nothing about rk 0 . However, we also indicate that a p.p.t
distinguisher DC can not detect this inconsistency.
The virtual black-box security needs the output distribution
of the simulator is computationally indistinguishable to the
output distribution of obfuscator O even the distinguisher D
VOLUME 5, 2017
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FIGURE 9. Experiments of Nice and Junk with oracle circuit C .

gaining oracle access to C. In order to show these two distributions are indistinguishable, we define two distributions:
Nice(DC , λ, aux) and Junk(DC , λ, aux) as in Fig. 9.
It is easily to show that the output distribution of
Nice(DC , λ, aux) is identical to the obfuscator O, and the
output distribution of Junk(DC , λ, aux) is identical to the
simulator S, respectively. We have the following lemmas.
Lemma 4: For any aux ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) , any circuit
C ∈ Cλ , an obfuscation output C 0 ← O(C), and for all p.p.t
distinguisher D, there exists
 C 0
D (C , aux)

λ

≈s Nice(DC , λ, aux)

Proof: Lemma 4 is obviously: Nice(DC , λ, aux) initializes the input of re-encryption algorithm, and then obtains
the output of the distinguisher D from the obfuscator taking
as input a correct re-key and the other parameters. From
the view of D, the re-key rk2 is uniformly distributed in
Gu since the secret keys sk i and sk j are randomly selected
from Zp (|p| = λ). Thus the distribution Nice(DC , λ, aux) is
identical to the distribution {DC (C 0 , aux)}λ in which C 0 is an
obfuscated re-encryption circuit.
Lemma 5: For any aux ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) , any circuit
C ∈ Cλ , an obfuscation output C 0 ← S C (λ, aux), and for
all distinguisher D, there exists
 C 0
D (C , aux)

λ

≈s Junk(DC , λ, aux)

Proof: In the Junk game, as the re-keys rk1 , rk2 and rk3
are at random selected from Zn−1 , Gu and G1 respectively,
and the output of Junk is identical to the output distribution
of simulator S. Actually, these distributions are also identical
when taking as ill-formed inputs, for example, u 6 ∈ Zn−1 ,
w 6 ∈ Zn−1 , and even u + v + w ≥ n − 1.
In order to show the virtual black-box security such that
the distinguisher D cannot differ the output of obfuscator O
from the output of simulator S, we now need to prove that
the distributions of Nice and Junk are indistinguishable in the
VOLUME 5, 2017

presence of having oracle to circuit C. We have the following
lemma.
Lemma 6: Under the MDDDH assumption in multilinear groups, for any p.p.t distinguisher D which has ability
access to oracle circuit C, and some auxiliary information aux, the following distributions are statistically
indistinguishable. i.e.,

1(Nice DC , λ, aux), Junk(DC , λ, aux) ≤ µ(λ)
Proof: Notice that the outputs of experiments Nice
and Junk are only single bit b, and the statistical indistinguishability follows two experimental distributions. Assume
that there exists a distinguisher D which can distinguish
Nice(D, λ, aux) from Junk(D, λ, aux) with non-negligible
advantage , then we can construct an algorithm B to solve
the MDDDH problem with the same advantage.
Given an MDDDH instance (g, gc1 , gc2 , Q) together with
auxiliary information aux, B’s goal is to decide whether
c /c
Q = gk2 1 or not. B calls D as a subroutine by giving its
instance input as input to D, and works as:
r
1) At random select α ← Zp .
2) Run D(gc1 , gc2 α , w, (u, Qα ), aux) and respond the
MDDDH output with D’s output.
Implicitly, we set pk i = gc1 , pk j = gc2 α , and the re-key
c α/c
rk2 = Qα . If the re-key rk2 is valid, i.e., Qα = gk2 1
c2 /c1
to obtain the decision Q = gn , in which the input to
distinguisher D is identically distributed to Nice(D, λ, aux).
c /c
Otherwise, rk2 is invalid and Q 6 = gk2 1 , and the input to D
is identically distributed to Junk(D, λ, aux).
We now consider the distinguisher DC which has access to
the re-encryption oracle to circuit C. We define the following
probabilities:
ψ(λ, aux)
= Pr[Nice(DC , λ, aux) = 1] − Pr[Junk(DC , λ, aux) = 1]
ϕ(λ, aux)
= Pr[Nice(DR , λ, aux) = 1] − Pr[Junk(DR , λ, aux) = 1]
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where oracle R outputs randomly selected elements for a
re-encryption ciphertext.
We now continue to prove the probability distributions
of ψ(λ, aux) and ϕ(λ, aux) are indistinguishable under the
XMDDDH assumption: if a p.p.t algorithm A distinguishes
the distributions then there exists an algorithm B to solve the
XMDDDH problem with advantage at least 21 |ψ(λ, aux) −
ϕ(λ, aux)|.
Obtaining an XMDDDH instance 0 = (g, gc1 , gc2 ,
c c /c
1/c
g 3 , Q), B decides Q = gk2 3 1 or not. Let gc2 = gαc1
c c /c
αc
for some unknown α ∈ Zp . If Q = gk3 2 1 = gk 3 , then
1/c
[k, Q, g 3 ] is a valid re-key for the delegator of public key
pk i = gc1 and delegatee of pk j = gc2 .
B answers the XMDDDH problem with the output with
A’s distinguish output of ψ(λ, aux) and ϕ(λ, aux). B works
as follows:
1) Sample a challenge bit β ∈ {0, 1} randomly, in which
β = 0 means to run Nice and β = 1 to run Junk.
2) Set pk i = gc1 , pk j = gc2 where gc1 and gc2 are the
elements of instance 0.
r
r
3) At random select z ← Zp , and group elements h1 ←
r
Gk , h 2 ← G1 .
4) Generate a valid re-key
z
1/c3 1/z
) ]
rk [k]
pk →pk = [rk1 , rk2 , rk3 ] = [k, Q , (g
i

j

where Q and g1/c3 are the elements of instance 0.
5) If β = 1, run DO (pk i , pk j , w, (k, h1 , h2 ), aux).
Otherwise, if β = 0 then run DO (pk i , pk j , w,
(rk1 , rk2 , rk3 ), aux), where oracle O is defined and
responded as follows:
Response of oracle O:
a) Whenever the query is x = keys, return with
(pk i , pk j ), and any error occurs then return ∅.
Otherwise, proceed with the following:
b) Parse x = [c0 , c1 , c2 ] ∈ Zn−1 × Gc0 × Gn .
r
c) Sample an input re-randomized value γ ← Zp .
d) Re-randomize the input:
γ
c00 ← c0 , c01 ← c1 e(pk i , gv−1 )γ , c02 ← c2 · gn .
00
e) Calculate c0 ← c0 + k + w.
f) If c000 ≥ n, return with ∅, otherwise proceed as
g) Calculate c001 ← c01 e(c01 , gw−1 , rk2 , rk3 ).
h) Calculate c002 ← c02 .
r
i) Sample an output randomized value γ 0 ← Zp .
j) Return with the re-randomized tuple
0
γ0
[c000 , c001 e(pk j , gk , gv−1 , gw−1 , rk3 )γ , c002 gn ].
6) Finally, B answers the XMDDDH problem with the
output β 0 of A. If β 0 = 0, which means that
c c /c
Q = gk3 2 1 in running oracle DO (pk i , pk j , w,
(rk1 , rk2 , rk3 ), aux), and outputs 1 which means that
c c /c
Q 6 = gk3 2 1 in running oracle DO (pk i , pk j , w,
(k, h1 , h2 ), aux) with randomly selected re-key rk =
(k, h1 , h2 ).
We implicitly set pk i = gc1 and pk j = gc2 that perfectly hide the secret values c1 and c2 . From the XMDDDH assumption, gc1 and gc2 are uniformly distributed
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in G1 . The distinguish of valid or invalid re-key from
the tuple [k, Qz , g1/c3 z ] is equivalent to the distinguish
of running DO (pk i , pk j , w, (rk1 , rk2 , rk3 ), aux) or running
DO (pk i , pk j ,w, (k, h1 , h2 ), aux), which provides the perfect
protection of sensitive information [rk1 , rk2 , rk3 ] from the
obfuscation.
VI. PERFORMANCE

The candidate realization of multilinear maps was first proposed by Garg et al. (namely GGH framework) [16]. Later,
the improvement was presented by Langlois et al. (GGHLite
framework) to offer smaller parameter sizes [26]. Compared
with leveled multilinear maps in this work that encoding is
deterministic, the encoding of candidate multilinear maps
proposed by Garg et al. [16] is randomized in GGH framework, which means that it is not trivial to test whether two
strings encode the same element. The additional test should
be provided in GGH framework. Reference [1] provides a
more efficient implementation of multilinear maps in ideal
lattice primitives.
A. GRADED ENCODING SYSTEM

GGH’s n-graded encoding system is constructed as follows: Considering our scheme in GGH framework, for any
i-th group Gi (i ∈ [n]) of prime order p, we consider the
ring Zp . For an element α ∈ Zp , we can consider αgi as the
‘‘encoding’’ of α in Gi . We denote this encoding by enci (α).
Note that this encoding is easy to compute but hard to invert.
The multilinear map allows us to implement n encodings
{enci (αi )}i∈[n],αi ∈Zp . Graded encoding schemes give a similar
functionality, albeit with randomized and noisy encodings,
and with a procedure for testing equality of encoded elements in the final group Gn . From the GGH framework,
the size of public parameters is O(n3 λ5 log(nλ)) and the size
of group elements is O(n2 λ3 ). From the GGHLite framework,
the size of public parameter is O(n3 λ log2 (nλ)) and the size of
group elements is O(n2 λ log2 (nλ)). In our scheme, every level
ciphertext (different hop) has the same size. The computation
cost is decided by the number operation of multilinear map.
In proposed obfuscation scheme, it only needs 3 pairing
operations and 4 product operations in multilinear group.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper, we designed an obfuscator for re-encryption
program that supports flexible, controllable and transitive
multi-hop, in which we can deploy the program obfuscator run on a (malicious) untrusted sever, while no sensitive
information was revealed even the server traces into the program or monitors the breakpoint. We constructed the concrete
scheme and its obfuscated version. We also provided several deployments and scenarios for our scheme, and demonstrated that our scheme supports flexible and controllable
re-encryption delegation.
Compared with related schemes, our proposed scheme
is obfuscatable, which protects the re-encryption algorithm
from trace-into attack and white-box access in case that
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computing platform is controlled by the attackers. We point
out the interesting directions for the future:
1) Our scheme supports obfuscation for unidirectional
re-encryption algorithm, which can be used in multihop and unidirectional delegation. May we construct
an obfuscation for bidirectional multi-hop? For example, using an untrusted server/router help to transfer
the encrypted message in two-way communications.
Actually, bidirectional multi-hop delegation will form
a bidirectional delegation chain, which can not explicitly construct in multilinear map since this map is
unidirectional.
2) From the viewpoint of efficiency, Zimmerman [35]
indicated that using clean multilinear maps and fully
homomorphic encryption scheme, all circuits could be
obfuscated directly, without the need for bootstrapping However, it is inefficient in practice. We focus
on the practical obfuscation for concrete functionality,
re-encryption, to give a better balance of security and
efficiency. Important future work would be to improve
the efficiency to run on lightweight devices such as
smartphone, Internet-of-Things and so on.
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